Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Improving the National Guard’s Capacity to Provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities

By Col. Colonel Thomas Carden
Commander, 560th Battlefield Subservience Brigade
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master of Strategic Studies Degree from the U.S. Army War College
August 8, 2008

On September 11, 2001, the National Guard started a no-notice transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. This transformation stretched the National Guard’s capacity to perform its role in homeland security and civil support. It is important to note that the National Guard is the only Department of Defense entity with responsibility to both the state and federal government.

The dual missions of the Guard have become the subject of extensive debate and controversy since 9/11. When Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana and Mississippi, the National Guard found itself fighting insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously providing much needed support to civil authorities in New Orleans and Mississippi. The extensive requirements associated with the Global War on Terror (GWOT), a pre-9/11 resourcing model, and the lack of clear civil support requirements create unacceptable vulnerabilities that require immediate action to improve the National Guard’s capacity to respond to provide support to civil authorities.

Improving the National Guard’s Capacity to Provide Support to Civil Authorities

Preparing for persistent natural and manmade threats will demand an ever-increasing civil support response capability from the National Guard. The 2008 report issued by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves indicated the Department of Defense failed to provide the necessary resources for the Guard to prepare for its domestic missions. In addition, a Government Accounting Office report issued in April of 2008 noted that the federal government failed to identify the Guard’s requirements for large-scale disasters affecting multiple states. Further, the Guard’s support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) has placed additional strain on both the personnel and equipment needed to provide support to civil authorities. In May of 2007, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, the chief of the National Guard, estimated that the Guard equipment shortfall amounted to approximately $48 billion. The extensive requirements associated with the Global War on Terror (GWOT), a pre-9/11 resourcing model, and the lack of clear civil support requirements create unacceptable vulnerabilities that require immediate action to improve the National Guard’s capacity to provide support to civil authorities.

In order for one to appreciate the necessity of improving the Guard’s capacity to provide civil support, it is essential to understand the unique role of the Guard. The Guard is the only military entity that has both a state and federal mission. Major General (Retired) Arnold Punaro who chaired the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves described the Guard as the first military responder to domestic incidents. Punaro explained that the Guard is responsible for both state and federal missions. The National Guard consists of the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard. Both components are federally recognized, organized militias under the command of the governors of their respective states and territories when not specifically placed on active federal service. The Guard can serve under state control in a state active duty status or under Title 32 of the US Code. The Guard can also serve at the direction of the President under Title 10 of the US Code.

In addition to understanding the dual missions of the Guard, it is also important to review the differences between homeland defense and homeland security. Homeland Defense (HD) involves protecting the territory, population, and defense infrastructure of the United States against external threats. Homeland Security (HS) involves efforts to prevent domestic terrorist attacks as well as reduce vulnerabilities and minimize damage associated with terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The Guard functions in both HD and HS capacities on a daily basis. In fact, Friedrich Martin, who leads much of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) domestic operational planning, indicated that the Guard has maintained an average of more than 7,000 soldiers on active duty in either a state active duty or a Title 32 status throughout 2008. The critical domestic missions in which the Guard engages cut across a very broad range to include key asset protection, wildfire response, hurricane response, and seaport inspection.

The Guard’s ability to provide support to civil authorities is a critical element in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. This strategy identified protecting the American people as the nation’s first and most solemn obligation. When introducing this strategy, President Bush specifically addressed the challenges associated with preventing domestic terrorist attacks, while simultaneously preparing for natural and man-made disasters. The strategy notes that responding to disasters is not simply a federal responsibility. Federal, state, local and tribal governments as well as the private sector and individual citizens share responsibilities for homeland security and homeland defense. It is important to note that the Homeland Security Council’s work recognized that state, local, and tribal governments are, by default, the initial responders to any incident. The Guard consistently provides civil support as needed under the direction of governors or the President depending on the scale and status of specific disaster situations.

General (Retired) Punaro’s testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee points out that 50,000 of the 72,000 troops deployed in support of Hurricane Katrina were Guard Soldiers serving on either state active duty or in a Title 32 status. The Guard’s ability to respond quickly in a civil support role relies heavily on its presence in approximately 3,000 communities across the country. These widely dispersed elements of the Guard embedded into local communities enhance the disaster response capabilities of virtually all states and territories. Punaro's testimony reinforces the Guard’s indisputable role in defending the homeland and providing civil support.

Coordinating state and federal responses to large man-made or natural disasters is a daunting task. While this work focuses primarily on the National Guard, it is important to examine the vast array of stakeholders that assist in disaster response. In October of 2002, The Department of Defense established U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). This unified command is responsible for command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts in the United States, Alaska, Canada, and Mexico. United States Pacific Command is responsible for the Department of Defense’s homeland defense efforts in Hawaii and US territories and possessions in the Pacific. The United States Southern Command has responsibility for the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. The homeland defense tasks assigned to these critical command and control nodes constitute an increased recognition by the Department of Defense that their capacity to provide civil support is critical to securing our nation in the post 9/11 environment.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 outlined a number of requirements for the Department of Defense and the National Guard Bureau. This key piece of legislation holds the potential to make the nation safer by forcing all stakeholders at the federal level to engage in detailed civil support planning. It is important to note that the Department of Homeland Security is the lead federal agency in coordinating the national response to domestic incidents. However, the Department of Homeland Security relies heavily on the Department of Defense and the National Guard Bureau to assist in the planning, preparation, and execution of disaster response activities.

In January of 2008, the Department of Homeland Security published the National Response Framework (NRF). This document is a guide for how the nation conducts all-hazards response. The NRF assists in synchronizing the efforts of the wide array of government agencies and private sector entities that respond to domestic incidents. The NRF addresses a number of important issues to include roles, responsibilities, response actions, organization, and planning. An important sub-set of the planning guidance involves key scenario sets. The scenarios range from a nuclear attack to natural disasters, pandemic influenza, and cyber attacks. The NRF demonstrates the virtual maze of assets and entities that must work together to protect the American people and maintain public confidence and stability in times of national crisis. As the first military responders to disaster situations, the Guard plays a tremendous role in supporting the National Response Framework.

The scope of natural and man-made disasters generally determines the level and type of response from federal, state, local, and tribal entities. The shared responsibilities for homeland defense among different levels of government and various federal agencies make the Guard’s flexibility to respond in a civil support role more important than ever. In 1996, Congress increased the Guard’s utility in providing civil support by approving the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). The EMAC is a national mutual aid agreement that allows state-to-state assistance for homeland defense and homeland security. The EMAC sets the conditions for the Guard to provide immediate assistance across state borders. The benefit of the EMAC concept enabled a multi-state response during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Guard troops from 54 states and territories deployed to Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas using the EMAC system.

The research in the field of homeland defense and homeland security is extensive. This work is not an all-inclusive review of the National Guard’s role of providing civil support in a homeland defense and homeland security context. Further, this work will not address the specific response obstacles and capabilities of other reserve components, federal, state or private entities. This work is limited to addressing specific obstacles that prevent the National Guard from being as ready as it should be to provide military support to civil authorities in a post 9/11 environment. This limited approach highlights specific challenges followed by specific recommendations that, if embraced, will make our National Guard even more capable of protecting the American people from the full spectrum of natural and man-made disasters.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) versus Requirements at Home

There is an endless body of compelling evidence to demonstrate the challenges the Guard faces in balancing its federal and state missions. The GWOT forced the Guard to transform from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. The ongoing nature of the GWOT has strained both the active and reserve components of the Department of Defense. The work of Lawrence Korb and Sean Duggan described the Guard’s challenges as a crisis. While many will argue for and against this description, an objective analysis certainly gives rise to pressing concerns. While the Department of Defense’s significant reliance on the Guard is unavoidable given the realities of the GWOT, the costs associated with this condition continue to create unacceptable vulnerabilities at home. While no amount of planning or resources will eliminate all the vulnerabilities, it is clear that a more balanced utilization of the Guard holds significant potential for mitigating many homeland security issues.

One can quickly demonstrate the Guard’s significant troop requirement in support of the GWOT. In fact, a June 2008 National Guard Bureau report indicated that the Guard had 49,255 Army National Guard troops and 6,400 Air Guard members deployed overseas. This significant and ongoing personnel requirement is not limited to personnel, but extends to the overall readiness status of the Guard. Lieutenant General Steven Blum specifically addressed the overall impact of the GWOT in the Guard in August 2007 when he said, “National Guard readiness has been compromised by rotations abroad, most notably as part of the global war on terror.” Blum noted that prior to 9/11, the Guard did not have 100 percent of its authorized equipment. However, Blum made the important point that since 9/11, Guard equipment levels dipped to approximately 50 percent. He argued that this creates conditions that would leave the Guard unable to respond to a major disaster.

The fact that the Guard is deploying troops in support of GWOT is only part of the challenge associated with providing civil support. The troop formations rotate home at the conclusion of their tours. However, Guard equipment has often remained in theater for replacement units. Blum points to the combined impact of leaving equipment in theater and combat losses as the primary reasons why the Guard’s equipment levels have dropped to critical levels.

The vulnerabilities created by the Guard’s support of the GWOT have made national headlines and caused concern at the highest levels of the federal government. President Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 on January 28, 2008. This legislation included the National Guard Empowerment Act of 2007. This law requires the Secretary of Defense to begin providing quarterly readiness reports designed to assess the readiness of the Guard to perform domestic operations. On February 14, 2008, Lieutenant General Steven Blum provided a recommended methodology for reporting this information to the Secretary of Defense. Along with his recommendation, General Blum provided a current assessment of every state and territory based on his proposed criteria. The assessment demonstrates the struggle the Guard is facing in balancing its GWOT and civil support readiness challenges. For example, the assessment model rated 22 of the 54 states as inadequate in terms of responding to a chemical or biological attack. In addition, 24 states lack adequate engineering capability, 18 states lack adequate transportation capability, 20 states lack critical communications equipment, and 14 states lack adequate logistical capability. According to the reporting model, states rated inadequate in any area have readiness vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated using National Guard resources. This is further evidence that the Guard’s support for the GWOT has created unacceptable vulnerabilities in terms of the Guard’s capacity to respond to the homeland security and homeland defense needs of the nation.

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the coast of Louisiana. The response planning, preparation, and execution has undergone tremendous scrutiny. A number of studies to include one conducted by the Rand Corporation reveal that the National Guard is struggling to balance requirements at home and abroad. Response time, numbers of troops, and capabilities all play an important role in the Guard’s capacity to provide civil support. The report reviewed the troops available for the Hurricane Katrina response against the current Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model. The Rand report estimated that following the ARFORGEN model leaves even fewer Guard units available to governors today than when Hurricane Katrina came ashore. The research also points to the fact that the ARFORGEN model does not consider homeland security as a primary mission for the National Guard. This fact has implications in terms of training, personnel availability, and the overall readiness of the Guard to provide critical civil support capability. One could argue that the ARFORGEN model might address our troop needs abroad, but it creates unacceptable vulnerabilities at home.

The Guard’s commitment to supporting the GWOT is important. However, preparing for and executing homeland defense and homeland security missions can no longer take a backseat to the GWOT. The efforts to improve the Guard’s ability to balance GWOT and civil support requirements are ongoing. The report from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves coupled with the provisions outlined in the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2008 will provide Congressional visibility on the Guard’s readiness on a quarterly basis. Understanding vulnerabilities and reviewing them will provide our elected officials with an opportunity to mitigate weaknesses with funding, legislation, or other measures designed to protect the American people.

Pre-9/11 Resourcing Model

The first sentence in the updated National Defense Strategy (NDS) published by the Department of Defense in June of 2008 states that, “a core responsibility of the U.S. Government is to protect the American people.” While the Department of Defense (DoD) readily acknowledges its role in supporting the Department of Homeland Security in providing civil support, the DoD fails to budget for civil support missions. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves points out that the DoD falsely assumes that the resources provided to the Guard for wartime missions are adequate to address the vast array of civil support requirements. The Commission’s work points out that the DoD goes to great lengths to program and budget for countless initiatives, but fails to address the need to adequately resource a post 9/11 operational reserve.

The competition for resources at every level of government is fierce. The extensive state and federal missions that the Guard must address are growing larger and more complex by the day. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves recognized and noted the fact that the Guard executed an unplanned transition from a strategic to an operational reserve after 9/11. This transition took place without an operational resource structure. The Commission concedes that the Guard’s status as an operational reserve must continue in light of what the Commission described as the new security environment. The Commission’s report aptly points to the urgent requirement to allocate resources to ensure an operational reserve that is sustainable over time.

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) examined the role of the Guard in its post 9/11 homeland security capacity. The resulting GAO report highlighted a key point relating to the Guard’s evolving role in homeland security when it noted that prior to 9/11, the states held the primary responsibility for the Guard’s civil support missions. However, since 9/11, the Guard consistently responded to homeland security needs and natural disasters of national significance. The report compares the increased demand for the Guard to respond to missions at home and abroad with its static resourcing model rooted in Cold War requirements.

The GAO’s work makes a compelling case that a pre-9/11 resourcing model does not account for current civil support realities that limit the Guard’s ability to prepare and execute its missions at home. For example, current DoD policy prohibits the Guard from utilizing federal funds to acquire and maintain supplies or equipment exclusively for civil support missions. This policy alone creates unacceptable vulnerabilities that the nation must address so that the Guard can meet its civil support responsibilities.

Full-Time Support (FTS) is another significant resource challenge for the post 9/11 National Guard. Lieutenant General Steven Blum provided a statement to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves that revealed the importance of adequate FTS in preparing the Guard for its operational role. Blum pointed out that the Guard FTS reflected a pre 9/11 authorization that was not adequate to meet the Guard’s requirements prior to the transition from a strategic to an operational reserve. Blum went on to argue that the Guard needed 90 percent of its total validated requirement for FTS to meet increasing mission requirements at home and abroad.

General Blum’s statement to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves opens a critical window into the potential that the Guard has to respond in a civil support role versus the current capability. General Blum testified that with the exception of the units mobilized for the GWOT, his forces are bound by a Cold War resourcing model. This model extended past personnel and equipment shortfalls, but contributed to an extensive mobilization process that keeps units engaged longer than required. Clearly, this process denies governors use of the Guard for civil support missions in a disaster situation.

General Blum articulated his commitment to provide every state and territory with what he termed as 10 essential capabilities: a Joint Force Headquarters for command and control; a Civil Support Team (CST) for chemical, biological, and radiological detection; engineering assets; communications; ground transportation; aviation; medical capability; security forces; logistics and maintenance capability. All of the capabilities outlined by Blum represent the potential that the Guard holds in terms of closing the gap on unacceptable vulnerabilities in our nation’s homeland. General Blum’s comments coupled with all the evidence demonstrate that our country will not realize this potential using a pre-9/11 resourcing model.

Defining and Understanding Civil Support Requirements

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, the General Accounting Office, and the Rand Corporation conducted a detailed analysis of the Guard’s readiness to execute civil support missions. All were highly critical of the Department of Defense. While this criticism has its roots in solid evidence, the DoD is not alone in its neglect of the Guard. A recent GAO report points out that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead federal agency for homeland security failed to identify civil support requirements for the Guard. The report specifically noted the troubling vulnerabilities this creates in terms of planning and preparing for large-scale disasters that have the potential to impact multiple states.

The reasons why the DHS failed to identify specific civil support requirements for the Guard are unclear, but it appears that the DHS falsely assumed that either the DoD or the states would do the necessary planning exclusive of the DHS. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 recognized this disconnect and included planning directives for both the DHS and the DoD designed to identify the Guard’s civil support requirements. To date, the planning and analysis are not complete. The GAO notes neither the states nor the federal government has a plan in place for the Guard’s use in state-led missions funded at the federal level.

The DHS and the DoD are not alone in failing to ensure that the Guard’s civil support requirements are clearly articulated. The National Guard Bureau noted that the state and local governments must step forward with their civil support requirements. General Blum argues that this detailed planning will allow his leaders to evaluate state requirements against the National Response Framework (NRF). Analysis of this nature has the potential to reveal capabilities and gaps that require mitigation. At this point, unnecessary vulnerabilities place the American people in danger. These vulnerabilities require action at a number of levels from local emergency management agencies to the Department of Homeland Security.

The lack of clearly identified Guard civil support missions has a number of second and third order effects. For example, Congress simply does not appropriate funds to support the Guard’s civil support missions. However, the Guard responds immediately to disaster situations and incurs costs in doing so. The National Guard Bureau noted that reimbursement in these situations is extremely problematic. This creates yet another resource drain that comes at the expense of the overall readiness of the Guard to respond to additional contingencies at home and abroad.

The lack of clear civil support requirements for the Guard along with the associated funding and readiness issues captured the attention of many Congressional leaders in early 2008. On February 7, 2008, Senators Patrick Leahy and Christopher Bond joined Representatives Gene Taylor and Tom Davis in drafting a letter urging Defense Secretary Robert Gates to acknowledge the Guard’s expertise in the realm of domestic defense. More importantly, the letter noted the requirement to draft a Guard specific plan to respond to all 15 key scenario sets identified by the Homeland Security Council. Further, the letter noted that drafting these plans and their associated requirements are long overdue given the current threats to the nation both natural and man-made.

The evidence is indisputable that stakeholders at every level have failed to identify their requirements for National Guard support in times of disaster. This failure constitutes unfunded requirements that the Guard must address when Americans are in need. These unfunded requirements are a drain on personnel as well as equipment. The impact of this failure results in an immeasurable degradation on the Guard’s overall readiness. This unhealthy cycle results in making our nation more vulnerable and less secure.

Closing the Appalling Gaps

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves noted appalling gaps in the nation’s homeland security and homeland defense posture. As the first military responders to natural or man-made disasters, the National Guard plays a vital role in both homeland defense and homeland security. This work specifically outlined the cause and effect relationships that contribute to the National Guard not being as ready as it should be to provide civil support. The current gaps between the Guard’s current capability to respond and its potential are troubling. It is instructive to not only identify the gaps but also compose meaningful recommendations on mitigating the unacceptable vulnerabilities that put the American people at risk.

Balancing the Guard’s extensive requirements in support of the GWOT with improving civil support capability constitutes a challenging task under the best conditions. Developing a deployment cycle that acknowledges civil support requirements is a critical first step in ensuring that the nation’s leaders understand vulnerabilities that arise as large Guard formations deploy overseas. This additional visibility early in the process sets the conditions for contingency planning to mitigate vulnerabilities.

The Guard’s equipment readiness challenges associated with the GWOT mount with every deployment as critical pieces of equipment remain overseas for replacement units. Discontinuing this practice immediately is essential to ensuring that the Guard can respond effectively to disaster situations.

The pre-9/11 or strategic reserve resourcing model restricts the Guard’s ability to generate the readiness required of a post -9/11 operational reserve. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 constitutes a road map to address many of the Guard’s civil support challenges. This important legislation directs the DoD to plan for the Guard’s response to natural and man-made disasters. The statutory planning requirements in the 2008 NDAA sets the conditions for multi-state contingency plans that will eventually make the American people safer. The level of detail associated with these plans will determine their effectiveness. It is critical that the DHS, DoD, and NGB mount an aggressive and synchronized planning effort that includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as well as state emergency management leaders. Such an effort will improve the Guard’s ability to respond to large multi-state emergencies.

The National Guard has identified countless civil support requirements from the local to the national level. However, the Guard continues to operate without a comprehensive and commonly recognized civil support requirement list. This critical deficiency has led to unfunded civil support requirements that make the nation more vulnerable to the impact of natural and man-made disasters. Again, the framers of the NDAA of 2008 recognized this problem and directed the identification of Guard civil support requirements.

The 15 key national planning scenario sets will serve as the basis for determining the validated civil support requirements for the Guard. Validated requirements set the conditions for federal funding. Debate regarding the development of an appropriate funding mechanism to address Guard civil support requirements is ongoing and important. However, the mechanism is not nearly as important as developing a commonly accepted civil support requirements list. This critical task list will serve as a guide for more than just funding. The Guard can use validated requirements to structure training and acquire equipment to meet needs at the local, state, and national levels.

The National Guard is America’s first military response element for any natural disaster. The post-9/11 security environment makes the Guard’s role in civil support more important than ever. This work outlined much of the Guard’s evolving civil support role as well as many of the new systems and structures implemented since the inception of the GWOT. This undeniable evidence demonstrates that the Guard is struggling to balance requirements at home and abroad without adequate resources and unclear requirements.

There is no perfect set of contingency plans, resourcing models, or requirements list guaranteeing complete national security or preparedness. However, there are many basic steps to ensure that the Guard’s role in civil support is one defined by continuous improvement. Funding and time are limited resources. The Guard’s 48 billion dollar equipment deficit did not accumulate overnight. Overcoming this equipment deficit will take significant time and effort. However, a synchronized planning effort to ensure the Guard understands its civil support role in addressing a large multi-state disaster constitutes just one of many mitigation steps that require more effort and cooperation than funding. Our nation’s leaders must prioritize requirements and decide where to accept risks. If securing the American people is truly our first and most solemn responsibility as a nation, we must ensure that the National Guard, our first military responders, is always ready.

Endnotes


[1] U.S. Congress, Commission on The National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Executive Summary, 31 January  2008, 20.

[2] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security, Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008), 4.

[3] Lawrence J. Korb and Sean E. Duggan, “Caught Off Guard: The Link Between Our National Security and Our National Guard,” Center for American Progress (May 2007): 4.

[4] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Final Report to Congress Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Testimony of Major General (R) Arnold L. Punaro, Lieutenant General James E. Sheppard, and Major General Gordon E. Stump, February 13, 2008:6-7.

[5] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense), (30 May 2008), 243.

[6] Fredrich L. Martin, "National Guard Bureau Daily Domestic Operations Overview,” Daily Briefing slide with mission breakdown notes, Arlington, VA, National Guard Bureau, 30 July 2008.

[7] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Defense), (October 2007), 1-4.

[8] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Final Report to Congress Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Testimony of Major General (R) Arnold L. Punaro, Lieutenant General James E. Sheppard, and Major General Gordon E. Stump, February 13, 2008:6-7.

[9] United States Northern Command Home Page, available from http://www. northcom. mil/about/index.html; Internet; accessed 31 July 2008. 

[10] U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Coordinating Disaster Response for US Military Forces in Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Operations, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense), (15 May 2008), iii, 1-2.

[11] Homeland Security Council, National Response Framework, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Defense), (January 2008), 1-2.

[12] The National Guard’s Role in Homeland Defense Home Page, available from http:// www. ngb.army.mil/features/Homeland Defense/emac//factsheet.html.

[13] Korb and Duggan, 1-2.

[14] Fredrich L. Martin, "National Guard Bureau Daily Domestic Operations Overview,” Daily Briefing slide with mission breakdown notes, Arlington, VA, National Guard Bureau, 30 July 2008.

[15] Breanne Wagner, “Equipment Shortfalls Compromise Disaster Preparedness, Guard Says,” National Defense, (August 2005): 14.

[16] Ibid, 14.

[17] Ibid, 14.

[18] Lieutenant General Steven Blum, “Report on National Guard Readiness for Emergencies and Major Disasters,” Arlington, VA, National Guard Bureau, 15 February 2008, 1-2, 6-8.

[19] Lynn E. Davis et al., “Hurricane Katrina; Lessons for Army Planning and Operations,” Rand Corporation, (2007), Santa Monica, CA. 58-60.  

[20] U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense), (June 2008): 1.

[21] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 20.

[22] Ibid, 7, 11. 

[23] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security, Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008), 19, 42-43.

[24] Ibid, 42-43.

[25] Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Statement before the Commission on National Guard and Reserves on the Appropriate Role of the National Guard and Reserves in Homeland Security and Homeland Defense,  Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006: 8.

[26] Ibid, 1-3.

[27] Ibid, 5.

[28] U.S. Government Accountability Office, 4.

[29] Ibid, 12-13.

[30] Lieutenant General Steven Blum, “Report on National Guard Readiness for Emergencies and Major Disasters,” Arlington, VA, National Guard Bureau, 15 February 2008, 45.

[31] Ibid, 45.

[32] Patrick Leahy et al., Letter to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.) February 7, 2008: 1-2. 

[33] U.S. Congress, Commission on The National Guard and Reserves, Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Executive Summary, 31 January  2008, 20.

[34] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security, Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008), 1.

[35] Ibid, 12-13.

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